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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The only issue presented on appeal is: was the 
warrantless frisk of the appellant based on a constitutionally 
adequate, reasonable suspicion that the appellant was armed and 
dangerous? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. : 
ORLANDO F. ROYBAL, : Case No. 2 0560 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Orlando Roybal, appeals from a conviction 
and judgment imposed for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person, a felony of the second degree in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding on February 15, 
1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 21, 1984, the sheriff's 
office responded to a dispatch of a "family disturbance and shots 
being fired" at 3287 South 145 East, Salt Lake City, Utah which was 
the address of Orlando Roybal. (T. 70-71) The officers responding 
to the dispatch were met at the door by the owner of the apartment, 
Mr. Roybal. (T. 71) Mr. Roybal related to the officers that two 
individuals had attempted to break into his apartment and during 
the process shot holes in his window. (Id.) The officers nevertheles 
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arrested Mr. Roybal and after searching his person and home for 
weapons, with negative results, booked him into the Salt Lake 
County Jail. (T. 72) Within a few hours Mr. Roybal was released on 
pre-trial supervision and borrowed his sisterfs car to drive back 
out to his apartment. (T. 72) 
At about 9:00 a.m. on May 21, 1984 the sherifffs dispatch 
received a second complaint from Mr. Roybalfs address. (T. 5-6) 
This complaint was dispatched on the police radio as a "suspicious 
vehicle" with Orlando Roybal as the complainant. (T. 6-7) Officer 
Robert Mitchell was one of the officers that responded to this 
second dispatch. At the time Officer Mitchell responded to the 
9:00 a.m. "suspicious vehicle" complaint by Mr. Roybal he had been 
informed by another officer of the earlier incident at Mr. Roybalfs 
address. (T.7) It had been reported to him as a {family disturbance 
with shots being fired," with Mr. Roybal being arrested and no 
weapons recovered. (T. 7-8) It was also reported to Officer 
Mitchell that Orlando Roybal was at that moment still in the Salt 
Lake County Jail. (T. 9) 
When Officer Mitchell arrived at the scene, he parked his * 
patrol car and was waiting for other officers to arrive when he 
observed a Mexican-American, later identified as Orlando Roybal, 
walking toward his patrol car from the north end of the apartment 
about 50 yards away. (T. 15-16, 23) As Mr. Roybal approached the 
driver's side of the patrol car, he acknowledged who he was and 
Officer Mitchell patted him down and recovered a gun. (T. 18, 104) 
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Third District Judge Homer F. Wilkinson heard the case in a 
bench trial on August 29, 1984. At the close of testimony, the 
court gave the defense and the State the opportunity to submit 
written arguments on defendant's Motion to Suppress the fruits of 
the pat-down search conducted by Officer Mitchell (Addendums A and 
B). The Motion to Suppress was denied by Judge Wilkinson on 
October 29, 1984 (See Addendum C). On December 10, 1984 the court 
entered a verdict of guilty arid ordered a presentece report be 
prepared. On February 15, 1985 the court sentenced Mr. Roybal to an 
indeterminate term of from one to fifteen years at the Utah State 
Prison and a fine of $10,000.00. The court stayed the execution of 
the prison sentence and fine and placed Mr. Roybal on probation for 
18 months, fined him $1,000.00, and required 450 hours of community 
service. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant argues on appeal that the warrantless 
"frisk" search of him by Officer Robert Mitchell violated the 
appellant's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
The frisk was based entirely on information, much of which was 
erroneous, received by officer Mitchell from other police officers 
regarding an incident reported by the appellant early that morning. 
The testimony of officers Mitchell and Baird, as well as the 
testimony of the appellant are in agreement that: (1) the 
Appellant was not observed violating any laws, (2) the appellant 
did not make any furtive or suspicious movements or gestures, (3) 
Officer Mitchell never felt that his life was endangered by the 
appellant. Therefore, the warrantless frisk of the Appellant was 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unreasonable and the trial court erred in refusing to grant the 
appellant's motion to suppress, 
ARGUMENT 
THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT WAS IN VIOLATION 
OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence obtained from the pat-down search of the defendant, 
Orlando Roybal. The defense did not contest Mr. Roybal!s 
possession of the firearm nor was the defendant's status as a 
restricted person contested. Howeverf the evidence resulting from 
the search of the defendant should have been suppressed because the 
searching officer did not have constitutionally adequate, 
reasonable grounds for the warrantless search of Mr. Roybal, thus 
violating his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure. United States Constitution, Amendment IV. 
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 14. 
With only a few specifically established exceptions, 
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval of judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment." Katy v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
The burden is on the state to show the warrantless search came 
within one of the established exceptions. Coolidqe v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). (See State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1983) listing the exceptions to the warrant requirement). In 
the present case it is the "stop and frisk" exception articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968) which is relied on by the state to justify the warrantless 
search. 
-4-
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In Terryf supra, and its companion case Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40 (1968), the United States Supreme Court attempted to 
define the acceptable limits of the universal police practice known 
as "stop and frisk", which is the practice whereby officers stop 
suspicious individuals for questioning and, occasionally, search such 
persons for dangerous weapons. The court, in Terry, considered in some 
detail the "frisk" component of the "stop-and-frisk" procedure. 
The court concluded that a "frisk" is indeed a "search" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court then held that a frisk 
could only be performed by an investigating officer in a search for 
weapons which could be used against the officer or others in the 
immediate vicinity. Further, the court found that "in justifying 
the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point 
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The court did not require an 
officer to establish that it was more likely than not that a 
suspect was armed and dangerous, but "only that there was a 
substantial possibility that the suspect possessed items which 
could be used for an attack and that he would so use them." 3 
LaFave, Search and Seizure 114 (1978). Clearly, then, some quantum 
of evidence must be presented that a suspect is armed and dangerous 
before an officer can initiate a frisk. "A police officer is not 
entitled to search every person he sees on the street or of whom he 
makes inquiries. Before he places a hand on the person of a 
citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally 
adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so." Sibron 392 U.S. at 64. 
-5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Justice Harlan, agreeing with the reasoning and holding of the 
Court, wrote a thoughtful concurrence in Terry, supra, to 
elaborate on the reasonableness requirement of frisks. Not only 
must the frisk be based on specific and articulable facts to 
justify the intrusion, the police officer must have constitutional 
grounds to insist on the initial encouter out of which the frisk 
arises. Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33. Therefore a frisk can only be 
justified if the.facts of the situation justify an initial stop or 
the initial detainment. This reasoning is applicable even where, 
as in the case at bar, the defendant voluntarily stops to talk to 
the police officer but is then detained and frisked. The forced 
search of the detainee requires the curtailment of his liberty to 
leave at any time and therefore the officer, taking into account 
the words and actions of the approaching person, must have 
constitutionally adequate reasonable grounds to detain that 
person, before a frisk can even arguably be proper. 
Applying Terry to the case at bar, it is clear that only 
if the actions and words of the appellant, Orlando Roybal, created 
a reasonable suspicion that Roybal was involved in a criminal 
activity would Officer Mitchell be justified in detaining Roybal. 
If the detainment was proper, there still had to have been 
specific and articulable facts which would reasonably lead an 
officer to believe that his life or others lives were endangered 
before a frisk would be proper. 
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In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) the police, armed 
with a search warrant to search a tavern and its bartender for 
drugs performed pat down searches of the patrons of the tavern. 
Ybarra, a patron in the tavern, was frisked, and found to be 
holding a tin foil pouch containing heroin. The United States 
Supreme Court held that the police did not have specific and 
articulable facts justifying a reasonable suspicion that Ybarra 
posed a threat to anybody's life, and therefore the frisk was 
improper. The court found that: 
[U]pon entering the tavern, the police did not 
recognize Ybarra and had no reason to believe 
that he had committed, was committing, or was 
about to commit any offense under state of 
federal law. Ybarra made no gestures indicative 
of criminal conduct, made no movements that 
might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, 
and said nothing of a suspicious nature to the 
police officers. In short, the agents knew 
nothing in particular about Ybarra. . . (Id. at 
90-91). 
The court concluded that "[t]he initial frisk of Ybarra was simply 
not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and 
presently dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held 
must form the predicate to a pat-down of a person for weapons." 
Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar the appellant contends that the frisk 
by Officer Mitchell far exceeded the constitutional limits set in 
Terry, Sibron, and Ybarra, supra, as well as the Utah statutory 
stop and frisk provisions, Utah Code Ann. §§77-7-15 and 77-7-16 
(1953 as amended). The appellant was not stopped as a suspicious 
person; but voluntarily approached the sheriff's patrol car after 
he had personally called the sheriff's department to report a 
suspicious vehicle parked in front of his apartment. Officer 
Mitchell testified that he saw the appellant walk towards him Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from fifty yards away, and therefore he had a clear opportunity 
to observe the appellant. Yet there was no evidence that Mr. 
Roybal made any furtive movements or gestures or remarks so as to 
justify the weapons search. (T. 16-18). There was no suspicious 
conduct observed by Officer Mitchell to justify the detainment of 
the appellant in order to search him. (Idk ) But even if there 
had been, some suspicious conduct on the part of the appellant 
justifying further detainment and questioning, there was no 
evidence presented that officer Mitchell observed anything 
objectively indicating that the appellant was armed and presently 
dnagerous, as required in Terry, Sibron, and Ybarra. This fact 
was made clear in the following question and answer exchange 
between defense counsel and officer Mitchell: 
Q: He didn't do anything that indicated that he was 
going to do any violence toward you, did he? Did he 
make any moves or anything that made it indicate to 
you that he was going to do any violence toward you? 
A: No. (T. 23) 
Furthermore, Officer Mitchell testified that at the time he frisked 
Mr. Roybal, he did not know that the man was Mr. Roybal (T. 
24,25,41), and he testified that the search was based on a "sixth 
sense" hunch (T. 28). Therefore, any explanation of the search 
advanced by the state is simply not supported by the testimony of 
the searching officer, Officer Mitchell. 
The state may argue that Officer Mitchell was justified in 
detaining and searching the appellant because of the information 
that he had received from another officer that shots had been 
-8-
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fired the night before outside the appellant's residence and the 
erroneous information that the appellant was still in jail. But 
this argument is without merit because Officer Mitchell had no 
idea that the man was Orlando Roybal before frisking him. The 
court made clear in Terry v. Ohio, that an investigative stop or 
detention predicated on rumor or hunch is unlawful, even though 
the officer may be acting in complete good faith. The subjective 
good faith of the officer is not enough, the detainment and search 
must be objectively reasonable. 392 U.S. at 22. 
In the present case any suspicion on the part of Officer 
Mitchell could only have been based on the partially erroneous 
information given to him by another officer. There ws no conduct 
on the part of the appellant to corroborate Officer Mitchell's 
suspicions, and Officer Mitchell made no inquiries of the 
appellant before searching him. (T. 18) It is clear that the 
fact that there had been guns fired at the address earlier was not 
sufficient cause to search a person merely because he was in the 
area of the crime. (See State v. Swanigan, No. 19320 (Utah, March 
28, 1985) holding that the defendant's proximity to the crime, 
without any showing of suspicious actions on the part of the 
defendant, does not justify a warrantless "stop and frisk"). 
Without some suspicious actions on the part of the appellant, the 
detainment and frisk for weapons of the appellant was merely based 
on hunch, and therefore objectively unreasonable. 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
Because the warrantless frisk of Orlando Roybal was not based 
on a constitutionally reasonable suspicion the motion to suppress 
the gun should have been granted, and the trial court's refusal to 
do so constituted reversible error. The state would have had 
insufficient evidence to support the conviction of possession of a 
weapon by a restricted person if the gun had been suppressed, as 
it should have been. Therefore, the appellant requests that this 
court reverse his conviction and order that a verdict and 
judgment of acquittal be entered. Alternatively, if this court 
feels that, even after excluding the weapon, the state still 
presented evidence which could be sufficient to base a conviction 
of possession of a weapon by a restricted person, the case should 
be remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this day of August, 1985. 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant 
I, LYNN R. BROWN, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this day of August, 1985. 
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DELIVERED by , this 
day of August, 1985. 
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MR. 
THE 
1 MR. 
THii 
argue Che case today or 
briefs? 
MR. 
indicated to the Court " 
to the Court on the two 
lin 
BROWN: That is all the witnesses. 
COURT: Any rebuttal? 
D'ELIA: No, Your Honor. 
COURT: Gentlemen, do you wish to 
do you wish to submit it on written 
BROWN: No, Your Honor. As I 
[ would like to submit a memorandum 
issues I think that are involved 
in this case. Submit it to the Court. I think I could have 
a memorandum to the Court within a week from Friday. 
THE COURT: A week from Friday. That 
would be the 31st. Then it would be the—Graver, you've 
got to get rid of your old calendar about now. The 7th of 
September, is that right? 
MR. 
THE 
say, a week from Friday 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
you give the State? 
THE 
MR. 
BROWN: What is the date? 
COURT: As I read it, from what you 
would be the 7th of September. 
BAILIFF: The 7th. 
BROWN: September 7. 
COURT: Yes. 
D'ELIA: Your Honor, how long would 
COURT: How long do you need? 
D'ELIA: Fourteen days. That is a 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR /^%2£lB+NB\ 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES. 266-0320 / - / ^ " ~ ^ ^ \ ? A 
COURTS BLDG 2-C E 4 S (801)535-7372 
231 JUDGE B U U D J N G OFF 533-0800 
SALT LAKE riTY, UTAH 84111 
LVSR^^i 
--TZM) 
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J~UL 
maximum. I could probably have it in in about ten, but In 
case a trial pops up or two. T need until the 14th. I 
THE COURT: Do you have any objection? 
MR. BROWN: No objection. ! 
THE COURT: Then you will have yours in 
the 21st of September. 
MR. D'ELIA: Yes, Your Honor. Should we 
wait for a date to argue the motion, or whatever the case 
may be, or are we going to decide that now? 
THE COURT: Do you want to come in and 
argue it? 
MR. BROWN: Well, let's--
MR. D'ELIA: I would be willing to submit 
it on the memorandum. 
MR. BROWN: I want to see what the 
memorandums are, Your Honor. I think when I get the memorandum 
I could indicate to the Court at that time. 
THE COURT: Okay, You better after you 
get hi s memorandum, get i t to me fast because I may be 
deciding fast if you don't need argument. I will want to 
read them and when it is fresh. 
MR. BROWN: All right. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, gentlemen. 
And of course, understand, Mr. Brown and Mr. Roybal, that 
the question of contempt is still pending over this gentleman. 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA Dfl'VE 84107 RES 266-0320 
COURTS BLDG 240 E 4 S (801) 535-7372 
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LYNN R. BROWN 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
Attorney for Defendant 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
Plaintiff SUPPRESS 
V. : 
ORLANDO F. ROYBAL, : Case No. CR-84-762 
Defendant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 21, 1984 at about 9:00 a.m. Orlando F. Roybal 
was arrested after a pat-down search by officer Robert Mitchell 
revealed that Mr. Roybal was in possession of a firearm. He was 
arrested for being in possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person. 
The defense is not contesting the fact that Mr. Roybal 
was in possession of a firearm, but contends that the firearm 
was discovered by law enforcement pursuant to an illegal search 
and seizure and that the possession of the firearm by Mr. Roybal 
was only for the purpose to protect himself and his property. 
The facts that lead up to the pat-down search are as 
follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 21, 1984 the sheriff's 
office responded to a dispatch of a "family disturbance and shots 
being fired" at 3287 South 145 East, Salt Lake City, Utah which 
was the address of Orlando Roybal. The officers responding to 
the dispatch were met at the door by the owner of the apartment, 
Mr. Roybal. Mr. Roybal related to the officers that two individuals 
had attempted to break into his apartment and during the process 
shot holes in his window. The officers nevertheless arrested 
Mr. Roybal and after searching his person and home for weapons, 
with negative results, booked him into the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Within a few hours Mr. Roybal was released on pre-trial supervision 
and. borrowed his sister's car to drive back out to his apartment. 
At about 9:00 a.m. on May 21, 1984 the sheriff1s dispatch 
received a second complaint from Mr. Roybalfs address. This complaint 
was dispatched on the police radio as a "suspicious vehicle" with 
Orlando Roybal as the complainant. Officer Robert Mitchell was 
one of the officers that responded to this second dispatch. At 
the time Officer Mitchell responded to the 9:00 a.m. "suspicious 
vehicle" complaint by Mr. Roybal he had been informed by another 
officer of the earlier incident at Mr. Roybal's address. It had 
been reported to him "family disturbance with shots being fired," 
with Mr. Roybal being arrested and no weapons recovered. It was 
also reported to Officer Mitchell that Orlando Roybal was at that 
moment still in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
When Officer Mitchell arrived at the scene, he parked 
his patrol car and was waiting for other officers to arrive when 
he observed a Mexican-American, later identified as Orlando Roybal, 
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walking toward his patrol car from the north end of the apartment 
about 50 yards away. As Mr. Roybal approached the driver's side 
of the patrol car, he acknowledged who he was and Officer Mitchell 
patted him down and recovered a gun. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF ORLANDO FOYBAL WAS 
IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN FREE 
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH•AND SEIZURE. 
It is generally recognized that any search conducted 
outside the judicial process without prior approval by a magistrate 
is presumed to be unreasonable. State v. Kent, 20 U.2d 9, 432 
P.2d 64 (1967). The burden to "justify a warrantless search is 
upon the prosecution to show that the search is within one of 
judicially qualified exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 463 
U.S. 443 (1971). "A police officer is not entitled to search 
every person he sees on the streets or when he makes inquiries. 
Before he places a hand on the person of any citizen in search 
of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable 
grounds for doing so." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968). 
One of the judicially recognized exceptions to the warrantless 
search is the "stop and frisk" exception articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). The Terry case established the principle that a police 
officer can frisk for weapons search when he has reason to believe 
that such weapon could be used against the officer or others 
-3-
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in the immediate vicinity. In Utah this concept has been codified 
by statute which states: 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15. Authority 
of DPace officer to stop and question 
suspect -- Grounds. A oeace officer 
may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation 
of his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16. Authority 
of peace officer to frisk suspect 
for dangerous weapon -- Crouds. A 
oeace officer who has stopned a person 
temporarily for questioning may frisk 
the person for a dangerous weapon 
if he reasonably believes he or any 
other person is in danger. 
-^
n
 Terry, supra and its companion case, Sibron, supra, 
the United States Supreme Court attempted to define the acceptable 
limits of the universal police practice known as "stop-and-frisk." 
"Stop-and-frisk" is a time-honored police practice whereby officers 
stop suspicious individuals for questioning and, occasionally, 
to search such persons for dangerous weapons. Since, Terry courts 
have routinely divided this practice into its two components 
(i.e. the "stop" component and the "frisk" component) and have 
examined the resonableness of each component. In the present 
case, the stop portion of the Terry analysis is not applicable 
since it was Mr. Roybal that called for the assistance of the 
police and upon their arrival voluntarily approached the patrol 
car where officer Mitchell was standing. 
The Terry court considered in some detail the. "frisk" 
component of the "stop-and-frisk" procedure. The court concluded 
that a "frisk" is indeed a "search" within the meaning of the 
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Fourth Amendment. The court held that a MfriskM could only be 
performed by the investigating officer in a search for weapons 
which could be used against the officer or others in the immediate 
vicinity. Further, the court found that "in iustifyine theparticular 
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to jy^ cjjJ[ic 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." _^d. at 
21 (emphasis added). The court did not require an officer to 
establish that it was more likely than not that a suDsect was 
armed and dangerous, but "only that there was a substantial possibility 
that the suspect possessed items which could be used for an attack 
and that he would so use them." 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure 
114 (1978). Still, some quantum of evidence must be present 
that a suspect is armed and dangerous before an officer can initiate 
a frisk. Not every "stop" can result in a "frisk". 
Starting from Terry, various courts have attempted to 
identify the factors necessary for an officer to initiate a frisk 
of an individual which he has stopped. Two such cases are particularly 
relevant. 
• In Commonwealth v. Pegram, 301 A.2d 695 (Pa. 1973), 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the defendant's convictions 
of burglary and larceny. In that case two officers who had responded 
to a burglary call noticed the defendant, Pepram, in an alley 
near the scene of the burglary. When Pegram saw the officers, 
he ran away from them. A few minutes later the officers found 
Pegram and asked him to approach their vehicle, which he did 
voluntarily. After asking only the suspect's name, one of the 
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officers frisked. Pegram. The search yielded a knife and Pegram 
was arrested; a subsequent search of the suspect uncovered items 
which had been taken in the burglary. The Pennsylvania Court 
reversed the defendant's conviction since probable cause did 
not exist for Pegram1s arrest at the time of the stop. The court 
further held that the officers had no lawful justification to 
-frisk Pegram, noting that while the officers did observe "unusual 
conduct," "no such conduct was observed which would lead to the 
conclusion that appellant was either 'armed or presently dangerous.'" 
Id. at 698. 
In People v. Sherman, 593 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1979), officers 
of a special burglary investigation unit observed a group of 
youths, including the defendant, carrying beer bottles. After 
stopping the group and requesting identification (which was produced), 
the officers frisked each of the youths. Officers testified 
that the frisk was conducted as a safety measure. The frisk 
of the defendant produced a plastic bag which contained approximately 
100 pills. In affirming a lower court ruling suppressing the 
evidence, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the frisk was 
invalid since no rational basis was found for suspecting that 
the defendant was armed. The court found that the initial stop 
was reasonable. However, nothing in the circumstances surrounding 
the stop gave the officers reason to suspect that the defendant 
was armed and dangerous. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the present case it is the defense's contention that 
the frisk by Officer Mitchell of Mr. Roybal far exceeded the limits 
of Terry, Sibron and the Utah stOD and frisk provisions in Utah 
Code Ann. §$77-7-15 and 77-7-16. In this regard it should be 
noted that Mr. Roybal was not even stopped as a suspicious person^ 
But voluntarily approached the sheriff's patrol car after he had 
summoned assistance a few minutes earlier by calling the sheriff's 
dispatch. Officer Mitchell further testified that he observed 
Mr. Roybal walking toward him from 50 yards away. 
There was no evidence that Mr. Roybal made a-ny furtive 
movements or gestures as to justify a frisk for weapons search. 
There was no conduct observed by Officer Mitchell which would 
lead to a reasonable belief that Mr. Roybal was armed or presently 
dangerous. 
The facts in the present case are very similar to facts 
in Commonwealth v. Pegram, supra where the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reversed a burelary and larceny conviction based on an illegal 
frisk. 
DATED this day of September, 1984. 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of September, 1984. 
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